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Abstract
The speed of trading has considerably increased in recent years, due to progress in infor-
mation technologies and automation of the trading process. This evolution raises many
questions about the e¤ects of trading speed. In this chapter we discuss the ndings of
the growing theoretical and empirical literature on trading speed in nancial markets. We
argue that an increase in trading speed raises adverse selection costs but increases com-
petition among liquidity providers and the rate at which gains from trade are realized.
Thus, the e¤ect of an increase in trading speed on market quality and welfare is inherently
ambiguous. This observation is important for assessing empirical ndings regarding the
e¤ects of trading speed and policy making.
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1 Introduction
Progress in information and trading technologies have considerably increase the speedat
which trading takes place in nancial markets and trading speed is a dening characteristic
of high frequency trading rms (hereafter HFTs), such as Citadel, Virtu, Flow Traders or
Jump Trading.3
These rms account for a signicant fraction of the trading activity in electronic mar-
kets. For instance, according to a recent report for the Congressional Research Service
(Miller and Shorter, 2016), HFTs account for roughly 55% of trading volume in U.S. eq-
uity markets (40% in European equity markets), 80% of trading volume in currency futures
and about 66% of trading volume in treasury markets. For 2013 alone, the Tabb Group
estimates the investment in fast trading technologies at $1.5 billion, twice the amount
invested in 2012. This predominance of high frequency traders and the size of their in-
vestment in speed raise concerns about whether high frequency traders use speed at the
expense of slower traders (as argued by Michael Lewis in his best seller, Flash boys: a
Wall Street revolt) and whether their activity make markets less stable. For instance,
analysts have questioned the role played by high frequency traders in several disrupting
market events such as the May 6, 2010 ash crash in U.S. stock markets, the October 15,
2014 U.S. treasury ash crash, the January 1, 2016 Shanghai ash crash, or the British
pound ash crash of October 7, 2016.4
These concerns have led to several proposals to slow down markets and calls for regu-
latory interventions. For instance, some trading platforms (e.g., IEX or Alpha) now use so
called speed bumpsthat delay the time elapsed between the moment at which an order
arrives to a trading platform and the moment in which the order enters into the trading
platforms matching engine. Alternatively, Budish, Cramton and Shim (2015) proposed to
switch from continuous electronic order books (the current market organization in many
electronic markets) to frequent batch auctions, in which markets clearing would take place
only at discrete points in time (say, every seconds).
3The SEC denes high frequency traders as proprietary traders who use extraordinary high speed and
sophisticated computer programs for generating, routing, and executing orders.
4For an analysis of high frequency tradersbehavior during the May 6, 2010 Flash crash, see Kirilenko
et al. (2017).
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What is the economic rationale for such regulatory interventions? What are the market
failures that they intend to x? Why should we a priori expect the speed of trading to
be excessive? Economic analysis of these questions for high frequency trading is nascent.
To address them, one must rst understand why trading speed is important for high
frequency traders and through which channels it can a¤ect liquidity and pricing e¢ ciency.
We analyze these issues in Sections 2 and 3, respectively. Then, in Section 4, we discuss
possible reasons for which market forces might not generate the socially optimal level of
speed and why therefore regulatory intervention might be needed in this area.
2 Matching and Informational Speed
One way to assess speed in nancial markets is to measure how fast traders (or their
algorithms) and trading platforms communicate with each other, i.e., send messagesto
each other and process these messages. Messages are orders/instructions and reports of
various types. For instance, a buy market orderis an instruction to buy a given number
of shares sent by a trader to a trading platform. After receiving this message, the trading
platform processesit (i.e., matches the market order against standing sell limit orders)
and sends back a message to the sender conrming receipt and processing of his message.
Taking this perspective, one can measure trading speed (e.g., for a given trader and for a
given message) by the time elapsed between the moment a message (e.g., the market order
to buy shares in our example) is sent to a trading platform and the moment the sender
receives feedback from the trading platform (e.g., on the status of his order). This time is
often refered to as latency.
Latency has become extremely short in electronic securities markets, close to physical
limits. For instance, Baldauf and Moller (2017) report that the average exchange-to-trader
latency (the average time elapsed between the moment a message is sent by an exchange
to the moment it is received by the rm) is 31 microseconds on average for messages
pertaining to the SPDR S&P500 ETF (so called SPY, traded on the New York Stock
Exchange). High frequency traders make investments to minimize the time required to
process messages and send messages to exchanges, so presumably their overall latency
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is also extremely small. For instance, they have invested in fast communication lines
between markets, either using ber optics or microwave transmission (which is 30% faster
than ber optic lines), provided by rms such as Hiberna or McKay brothers.5 Using
microwave transmission, latency between trading platforms based in the Chicago area and
those in the New-York area is 8.02 milliseconds (source: McKay brothers website), close
to the theoretical lower bound (about 7.9 milliseconds).
Speed of trading is important for high frequency traders traders because it is key for the
protability of their strategies, in particular high frequency market making, high frequency
arbitrage, and directional trading on very short lived signals. The role of speed in these
strategies is best explained by considering a few examples.
Speed and Trading Strategies. First, consider a trading algorithm exploiting arbi-
trage opportunities between an ETF on an index (say, the SPY ETF traded on the NYSE)
and a futures on the same index, e.g., the E.mini futures on the S&P500, traded on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). When the price of the ETF is high relative to the
futures price, the algorithm will send buy marketable orders in the futures market and sell
marketable orders in the ETF market. It takes time for these orders to travel between
the computer running the algorithm and the trading platforms on which the ETF and the
futures are traded (New York and Chicago respectively). Moreover, once these orders have
reached these platforms, it takes time for the platforms to execute them against posted
quotes, conrm their status (whether they have been fully executed or not), and report
the prices at which they have been executed.
The high frequency arbitrageurs protability is higher if the time elapsed between the
moment at which his algorithm sends marketable orders and the moment it gets conr-
mation of their execution is short, i.e., if trading is fast, for at least two reasons. First,
the high frequency arbitrageur faces competition from other arbitrageurs. If competitors
are faster, they will take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity before the high frequency
trader and the latter will end up trading at bad prices (see Kozhan and Wah (2012) for
5The rst microwave network linking Chicago and New-York started operating in 2010 (see Shkilko and
Sokolov, 2016) and is used by traders to obtain fast information on quotes of futures on indexes traded
on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and on that of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) on these
indexes traded on equity markets located in the New-York area (e.g., trading plaforms such as the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), BATS, or DirectEdge).
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evidence). Second, quick feedback from trading platforms is key for risk management. For
instance, the buy marketable order placed by the arbitrageur might execute only partially
if the arbitrage opportunity vanishes before this order is processed by the CME. In this
scenario, the arbitrageur takes the risk of taking a non fully hedged position, which in turn
requires new quick actions. Chaboud et al. (2014), Budish et al. (2015), and Foucault et
al. (2017) provide evidence about high frequency arbitrage strategies.
Consider another example, namely a high frequency trader using price changes in the
futures market to forecast price changes in the index constituents. For instance, when the
price of the futures increases, the trader buys the index constituents that are the most
correlated with the index (e.g., which are more heavily weighted in the index).6 This is
a directional trading strategy based on very short lived signals, i.e., price changes in the
futures market. The protability of this strategy crucially depend on the high frequency
trader being able to observe and react to these signals before the price of the index con-
stituents adjust to reect the information contained in futures price changes. This requires
very fast access to the futures market datafeed and very fast access to trading platforms
on which the index constituents are traded. Brogaard et al. (2014) provide evidence of
such directional strategies on short lived signals (e.g., macro economic announcements or
changes in limit order books).
Finally, consider a market maker in one stock traded on two platforms, e.g., BATS
Europe (now Cboe) and the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Suppose that a buy market
order just get executed on BATS, consuming all the available liquidity at the best ask price
in this market. The bid-ask spread on BATS is now wider (say, that it increases from 1
cent to 5 cents). Quick information on this event is useful for the market maker for several
reasons. First, the arrival of a buy order on BATS is in itself a source of information,
which should lead the market maker to revise his quotes upward. The market maker
might then optimally decide to update his quotes on the LSE.7 Second, the new bid-ask
spread of ve cents on BATS might now be too large relative to the competitive level (say,
one cent). There is therefore an opportunity for submitting new, more competitive, sell
6See Hendershott and Riordan (2013) or Zhang (2017) for evidence that HFTs use future prices as a
source of information.
7This scenario is predicted by models of informed trading, such as Glosten (1994); see van Kervel (2015)
for evidence.
5
limit orders on BATS. Again the market maker must be fast to take advantage of this
opportunity. Speed matters because if the market maker moves rst, he will acquire time
priority at the competitive quotes leaving smaller or no prot to other market makers.
Last, suppose that the market maker is the rst to set a new competitive bid-ask spread
of one cent on BATS and that his o¤er is lift by another buy market order. The market
maker has now a short position. To reduce his position risk, he can place a buy market
order on the LSE. The faster this order is lled, the smaller is the risk faced by the
market maker. Lescourret and Moinas (2017) and Menkveld (2013) provide evidence of
multi-venue inventory management by high frequency market makers.
High frequency traders do not necessarily specialize in using one trading strategy (mar-
ket making, directional trading, and arbitrage) and might opportunistically use each of
them (although empirical evidence suggests that there is some specialization, see Boehmer,
Li, and Saar, 2017). Moreover, there are concerns that speed might also be used by some
traders for manipulating market prices and deceive other investors. For instance, the
CFTC has charged a U.K. trader (Navider Singh Sarao) of using a layering algorithm
to manipulate prices (see Complaint in U.S. vs. Navinder Singh Sarao).8
Layering is a manipulative scheme that consists in sending limit orders that are not
intended for execution and are therefore quickly cancelled after submission. The goal of
this scheme is to distort other tradersbeliefs regarding the value of the asset and prot
from such distorsions. According to the CFTC, N. Saraos layering algorithm repeatedly
submitted large sell limit orders away from the best quotes in the E.mini S&P500 futures
limit order book, without intending these orders to be executed (in fact 99% of these were
cancelled). The CFTC claims that these orders articially depressed the E-mini S&P500
price and increased its volatility, enabling N. Sarao to make prots by buying the E-
mini S&P500 at depressed prices. Similarly, the French market regulator (AMF) charged
Madison Tyler Europe (MTE) (now part of Virtu) or layering in December 2015. However,
dening price or market manipulation is di¢ cult, both in legal and economic terms (see
Fishel and Ross, 1991 and Kyle and Viswnanathan, 2008). In particular, as Kyle and
Viswanathan (2008) point out, it is di¢ cult to distinguish between trading strategies that
8See http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/
enfsaraocomplaint041715.pdf.
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undermine both price informativeness and liquidity (which they view as manipulative)
from trading strategies that just rationally exploit market power and private information.
Matching speed and Informational speed. The previous examples show that
two types of speeds matter for traders in nancial markets (e.g., arbitrageurs, directional
traders, or market makers): (i) informational speed, i.e., the speed at which traders
receive information (about their own trades, changes in quotes, otherstransactions etc.)
from trading platforms and (ii) matching speed, i.e., the speed at which orders are
processed and lled by the trading platform. Conceptually, matching and informational
speeds are di¤erent, e.g., a trading platform which is fast in executing incoming market
orders could be slow in providing information to traders. In practice, however, they are
bundled and di¢ cult to disentangle.
For instance, consider co-location, i.e., the possibility for traders to locate their algo-
rithms in close proximity to a trading platforms server. Co-location is a way to reduce
latency by minimizing the physical distance between tradersalgorithms and the trading
platform. It increases both the speed at which the orders sent by an algorithm are received
and processed by a trading platform (matching speed) and the speed at which the algo-
rithm receives information from the trading platform (informational speed).9 For instance,
Nasdaq OMX o¤ers three di¤erent types of co-location: basic, premium, and 10G (10 Gi-
gabyts). The premium colocation reduces the latency for order entry (matching speed) and
order book information retrieval (informational speed) while the 10G colocation reduces
the time from order submission to order conrmation for tradersalgorithms (see Brogaard
et al., 2015).
The dramatic increase in informational speeds in recent years is just the terminal point
of a long historical process. Astute speculators and exchanges have always sought to speed
up the transmission of information on trades and quotes using new information technologies
(such as carrier pigeons, the telegraph, the telephone, the ticker etc.). The rst undersea
9Some market participants might exploit only some aspects of co-location that suit best their trading
or investment strategies. For instance, some active funds may choose to be co-located when they rebalance
their portfolio in order to execute their trades in di¤erent stocks simultaneously and minimize their price
impact.
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transatlantic cable between Europe and the U.S. dates back to 1866 and was quickly
used to arbitrage price di¤erentials between Wall Street and the City (see Garbade and
Silber, 1978 and Hoag, 2006). Stock tickers were introduced in 1867 and the Boston Stock
Exchange and the NYSE were linked by the telegraph in 1889 to speed up the transmission
of information on trades and prices between these two markets. Similarly, speculation on
advanced access to news (public information) is in no way novel. For instance, around 1835,
the reporter Daniel Craig started selling advanced access to news from Europe arriving in
the U.S. by steamships. Steamships stopped in Halifax, allowing Craigs agents to read
the news and deliver them in Boston through carrier pigeons before the steamships arrived
in America. Craig was charging $500 for each hour of advance access to the news.10
In sum, the value of informational speed has long be recognized by traders and the
various strategies exploiting informational speed (cross-market arbitrage, market making
and directional trading) are not new. More novel is the scale at which high frequency
traders can deploy these strategies. To leverage their investments in informational speed,
high frequency traders typically trade in a large number of stocks and process at any given
point in time a very large amount of data. Thus, they must automate information process-
ing and the order submission process (algorithmic trading). In turn the automation of
order submission requires order processing by exchanges to be automated as well. Thus,
informational and matching speeds are complementary and they have been feeding on each
other (the automation of matching engines by stock exchanges began in the 1970s; see Jain,
2005). This complementarity is important for regulatory interventions, as one can a¤ect
the protability of high frequency trading by reducing informational or matching speeds
or both.
3 E¤ects of informational and matching speeds: the-
ory and evidence
There are four channels through which a change in tradersinformational and matching
speed can a¤ect costs of liquidity provision and gains from trade: (i) search, (ii) adverse
10See Wall Street, 1889: The telegraph ramps up trading speed,Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2014.
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selection, (iii) inventory risk, and (iv) competition among liquidity providers.
Search. Speed enables traders to nd a counterparty faster. In Pagnotta and Philip-
pon (2016), an exchanges matching speed allows buyers and sellers to be matched and
realize gains from trade more quickly. Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015) argue that, in
fragmented markets, informational speed allows traders to detect trading platforms with
the best quotes, and thereby to complete their desired trades, faster. For instance, investors
can buy fast access to exchange data feed to receive accurate information on posted quotes,
or use smart routers that instantaneously compare quotes across trading venues to split
their orders across platforms optimally. Similarly, in Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2014)
or Bongaerts, Kong, and Van Achter (2016), a traders likelihood of trading increases in the
speed with which he observes posted quotes. In all these models, trading faster shortens
the time required to realize gains from trade. We are not aware of any direct empirical
evaluation of this (potentially rst order) benet of trading speed.
Inventory Risk management. Speed helps market makers to better manage their
inventory risk. Ait-Sahalia and Saµglam (2017) analyze theoretically the optimal pricing
behavior of a high frequency market maker. The market maker receives buy or sell market
orders at random points in time and bears inventory holding costs. In choosing his quotes,
the market maker optimally balances bid-ask spread revenues with his inventory holding
cost (as, e.g., in Ho and Stoll, 1981). For instance, after accumulating a long position, the
market maker optimally stop quoting on the bid side (or shades his bid price) to reduce
his inventory. Ait-Sahalia and Saµglam (2017) characterize the market makers optimal
pricing policy and show that his bid-ask spread is smaller on average when he is faster.
Intuitively, trading faster enables the market maker to revise his quotes more frequently
and thereby to better manager his inventory position (e.g., to shade his bid more quickly
after accumulating a long position).
Brogaard et al. (2015) nd evidence for the inventory risk channel. Indeed, they show
that traders who buy the fastest co-location services on Nasdaq OMX are predominantly
market makers. Moreover, these market makers hold their inventory for a longer period
of time after buying the fastest co-location service, which suggests that their inventory
holding cost is smaller when they are faster. Consistent with this conjecture, Brogaard
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et al. (2015) also nd that fast market makersquotes are less sensitive to an increase in
their inventory positions than slow ones.
Adverse selection. Speed allows traders to get information and use it faster, possibly
at the expense of slower traders. For instance, consider the arrival of positive news for
the S&P500 index. Dealers in the E.mini futures mark up their quotes while liquidity
providers in ETFs on the S&P500 are slow in doing so. In this scenario, a high frequency
trader who observes the quote update in the E.mini futures can make a prot by buying
the ETFs at stale quotes. This prot is obtained at the expense of dealers in the ETFs
market.
This source of adverse selection (known as picking o¤, sniping or free option
risk) is due to di¤erential in speeds of reaction to news. It is by no way specic to modern
markets. Speculators buying advanced information on news from Daniel Craig in the
19th century (see Section 2) were already exploiting a faster access to news (see Copeland
and Galai,1983 or Foucault, Röell and Sandas, 2003 for other examples and models of
the picking o¤ risk that predate the development of high frequency trading). However,
automation of the trading process and the considerable increase in the speed at which
traders can react to news has made picking o¤ risk for liquidity providers much more acute.
Accordingly several theoretical papers have analyzed how the acceleration of access and
reaction to news (broadly dened, i.e., including quote updates for instance) a¤ects adverse
selection costs in nancial markets (see, for instance, Ho¤man, 2014, Biais, Foucault,
and Moinas, 2015, Foucault, Hombert, and Rosu, 2015, Budish, Cramton, and Shim,
2015, Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2016, Foucault, Kozhan, and Wah, 2017, or Menkveld and
Zoican, 2017).
Liquidity providers can reduce their exposure to picking o¤ risk by better monitoring
the ow of news and cancelling their quotes when they become stale, before they are lift
by other traders (quote snipers). News arrival is therefore followed by a race between
traders attempting to lift stale quotes before they are cancelled and liquidity providers
attempting to cancel their quotes before they are picked o¤. This race is one reason why
cancellations-to-trade ratios have considerably increased in recent years and has been one
driver of the massive investment in speed observed in the industry (see Foucault, Röell
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and Sandas, 2003, Biais, Foucault, and Moinas, 2015, Cramton, Budish, and Shim, 2015,
or Foucault, Kozhan and Tham, 2017 for models of investments in speed).
Consequently the net e¤ect of an increase in trading speed on adverse selection costs
depends on whether it makes liquidity providers relatively faster than quote snipers (di-
rectional traders or arbitrageurs) or vice versa. For instance, in Foucault, Kozhan, and
Wah (2017), an increase in arbitrageursspeed relative to dealers raises adverse selection
costs while a decrease in their relative speed decreases adverse selection costs.
Ultimately, which e¤ect dominates is an empirical question. Several empirical papers
nd support for the prediction that an increase in trading speed can raise adverse selection
costs. Chakrabarty et al. (2015) consider the SEC ban on unltered market access (so
called naked access). This ban is a negative shock on high frequency tradersspeed of
access to the market since unltered access enabled them to directly connect to exchange
servers, thereby bypassing brokerage controls. Moreover, it did not a¤ect traders regis-
tered as broker-dealers. Hence, it most likely a¤ected high frequency traders that are not
specialized in market making. Consistent with the view that fast trading by HFT can raise
adverse selection costs, Chakrabarty et al. (2015) nd that the unltered access ban is as-
sociated with a signicant drop in adverse selection costs and accordingly a drop in trading
costs. Foucault, Kozhan, and Wah (2017) consider a technological change that increases
arbitrageursrelative speed in the foreign exchange market and nd that this shock results
in an increase in adverse selection costs. In a similar vein, Shkilko and Sokolov (2016)
show that rain precipitations, which slow down the microwaves transmission of informa-
tion between Chicago and New-York, result in a decrease in adverse selection costs in
ETFs traded in New York. Again, this nding suggests that slowing down arbitrageurs or
directional traders exploiting lagged adjustments of prices across markets reduces adverse
selection. Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2016) show that high frequency traders
short selling activity has a negative e¤ect on liquidity because high frequency traders raise
adverse selection for other market participants.
There is also evidence that improving the speed at which liquidity providers can can-
cel their quotes is associated with improvements in liquidity and a reduction in adverse
selection costs. For instance, Hendershott et al. (2011) nd that the introduction of Au-
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toquote on the NYSE (which allows liquidity suppliers to become more quickly informed
about changes in the limit order book) is associated with an improvement in liquidity.
Brogaard et al. (2015) show that market makers become signicantly better at avoiding
adverse selection after upgrading their co-location with Nasdaq OMX and Biais, Declerck
and Moinas (2015) also nd that fast traders provide liquidity without making losses.
Competition. Speed intensies competition among liquidity providers. Indeed, fast
feedback on the state of the limit order book allows market makers to quickly identify
protable trading opportunities for two reasons. First, time priority has value in limit
order book markets. Indeed, price discreteness (a non zero tick) implies that limit orders
placed ahead of the queue at a given quote in the book are more protable than limit
orders placed further in the queue, as implied by models such as Glosten (1994), Parlour
and Seppi (2003), or Foucault and Menkveld (2008). Thus, after a transient increase in the
bid-ask spread due to the arrival of one market order, liquidity suppliers have an incentive
to race to be rst to supply liquidity at price points at which liquidity has vanished. Faster
traders are more likely to win this race and pocket the rents associated with time priority
(see, for instance, Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel, 2014, Section V.B). The value of time
priority is higher in stocks with larger tick sizes (as predicted by models such as Glosten,
1994, Parlour and Seppi, 2003, Foucault and Menkveld, 2008, or Foucault, Kadan, and
Kandel, 2014). Thus, high frequency market makers should be particularly active in stocks
with large tick size. Consistent with this prediction, Yao and Ye (2017) nd that HFTs
provide a larger fraction of liquidity in stocks with relatively large tick sizes.
Second, and relatedly, fast reaction to a change in the limit order book enables market
makers to undercut their competitorsquotes more quickly. Thus, when market makers
receive quicker feedback on the state of the book (e.g., because they can observe it more
frequently), quotes become competitive more quickly (see Cordella and Foucault, 1999 and
Bongaerts and Van Achter, 2016).
In sum, an increase in the speed at which liquidity providers react to the limit order
book should intensify competition among liquidity providers and thereby improve liquid-
ity. There is yet little empirical evidence on this channel. Brogaard et al. (2016) nd
that constraints on short selling activity by high frequency traders increases competition
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among liquidity providers, which goes opposite to the idea that their presence enhances
competition. More empirical research is needed on this question.
Net e¤ects on market liquidity and e¢ ciency. Overall, these channels suggest
that the e¤ects of speed on the costs of liquidity provision are complex. An increase in
speed can increase adverse selection costs for liquidity suppliers while increasing compe-
tition among liquidity providers and reducing their inventory holding costs. Empirical
studies should therefore carefully analyze the e¤ects of changes in trading speeds (due for
instance to technological upgrades) on each component of bid-ask spreads separately.11
Theory predicts that the e¤ect on adverse selection costs should be positive while the
e¤ect on inventory holding costs and order processing costs (which also include rents for
liquidity providers) should be negative. The net e¤ect on transaction costs is theoretically
ambiguous and might vary across samples, which explains why conclusions of empirical
studies regarding the e¤ect of high frequency trading on liquidity are not clear cut.
Speed can also a¤ect the pricing e¢ ciency of securities markets. Intuitively, accelerating
the ow of information on trades and prices help to make markets better integrated,
i.e., it brings prices more quickly in line with no arbitrage relationships. Garbade and
Silber (1978) show that the introduction of the telegraph in the U.S. had exactly this
e¤ect. In a similar vein, Chaboud et al. (2014) show that the introduction of algorithmic
trading on foreign exchange trading platforms has made triangular arbitrage opportunities
in currencies markets more short lived. Brogaard et al. (2014) also nd that high frequency
tradersorders tend to reduce noise in prices, making the latter closer to a random walk.
The social benet of the gains in pricing e¢ ciency brought up by super fast communi-
cation lines between markets is not clear, however. Price di¤erentials for identical assets
across markets suggest that gains from trade are not exploited. For instance, if a trader
is willing to buy an asset in market A at price higher than the price at which the asset
is o¤ered by another trader in market B, both traders should trade together. By buying
the asset in market B and selling it in market A, arbitrageurs correct the price di¤erential
and help traders located in di¤erent markets to realize gains from trade (see Foucault,
11Bid-ask spreads in nancial markets can be decomposed in three components: (i) adverse selection
costs, (ii) inventory costs, and (iii) order processing costs. see Foucault, Pagano, and Röell (2013), Chapter
5 for empirical techniques used to estimate each cost.
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Kozhan and Tham, 2017). Doing so at the speed of light is valuable only if traders
highly discount the time required for realizing gains from trade. More evidence is needed
on this question.
Moreover, although high frequency trading makes prices more e¢ cient, they do not
necessarily make prices more informative. In fact, high frequency tradersability to quickly
extract signals from order ows (trades and price changes), could increase the rate at which
informed investorsinformational advantage (alpha) decays. If this is the case then high
frequency trading might reduce the protability of producing fundamental information and
thereby make asset prices less informative about rmsfuture cash-ows in the long run
(see Dugast and Foucault, 2017 and Draus, 2017 for formal analyses of this possibility in
the broader context of automated information processing). Consistent with this prediction,
Weller (2017) nds a negative association between algorithmic trading activity in a stock
and the informativeness of the stock price about future earnings.
4 Are nancial markets too fast or too slow?
Concerns about the speed at which trading takes place in nancial markets has triggered
several proposals to slow down trading in nancial markets (see the introduction). Implicit
in these proposals is the view that market forces alone cannot set the right level of trading
speed and that trading speed is excessive for social welfare. Hence, regulatory intervention
is needed. What are the market failures that justify such intervention?
This is a di¢ cult question. As explained previously, investment in speeds by some
traders generates gains for these traders, possibly at the expense of other traders. For in-
stance, traders who get faster access to information make prots at the expense of liquidity
providers who are slow to update their quotes when new information arrives. Market mak-
ers who are fast in obtaining time priority capture a larger fraction of the rents associated
with time priority at the expense of slower market makers. In these examples, investment
in speeds redistributes gains from trade from slow to fast traders. However, per se, this
transfer is not su¢ cient to conclude that fast traders should be slowed down, unless one
takes the view that slow traderswelfare is more important than that of fast traders.
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A stronger case for regulating speed in nancial markets requires asking why (i) market
forces will not lead to the optimal level of speed from a social welfare viewpoint and (ii)
whether markets are too fast or too slow relative to this social optimum. These are complex
questions. To address them, one must develop economic models endogenizing both the
demand for speed by investors and the supply of speed by trading platforms, information
sellers (such as Bloomberg or Thomson-Reuters) or infrastructure providers (e.g., providers
of antenna for microwaves transmission). Some recent models (discussed below) have made
progress in this direction but more research is needed in this area.
Pagnotta and Philippon (2016) is a good example of such models. They analyze how
trading platforms compete in speed. In their model, the speed of trading on a platform
determines the rate at which buyers and sellers are matched. Thus, Pagnotta and Philippon
(2016) focus on the provision of matching speed and on the search benet of speed. They
show that trading platforms relax competition by choosing di¤erent speed levels, thereby
attracting di¤erent clienteles (as in models of vertical di¤erentiation). The equilibrium is
such that the levels of speed chosen by competing platforms is in general too low compared
to the level that would maximize welfare. The reason is that choosing a low speed is a
way for a trading platform to di¤erentiate from a faster market and retain market power.
Pagnotta and Phillipon (2016)s model however does not consider the role of informational
speed.
Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015) and Budish et al. (2015) develop models in which
traders can make investments to increase their speed of access to information. In Biais,
Foucault, and Moinas (2015), traders di¤er in their private valuations for a risky asset, so
that gains from trade exist. Each trader can choose, before learning his private valuation
for the asset, to invest in a trading technology to obtain (i) fast access to information about
the payo¤ of the asset (e.g., incoming news about earnings for a stock) and (ii) fast access
to trading opportunities. That is, the trading technology enables traders to acquire both
informational and matching speed. In this setting, an increase in the mass of fast traders
has an ambiguous e¤ect on aggregate welfare. On the one hand, speed has a search benet:
it enables fast traders to nd a counterparty more quickly (as in Pagnotta and Philippon,
2016). This is valuable because traders are impatient, so that they value more gains from
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trades realized earlier than later. On the other hand, as the mass of fast traders increases,
adverse selection increases. As a result, bid-ask spreads charged by liquidity providers
become larger and, for this reason, some traders optimally abstain from trading (to avoid
trading costs). This is a social loss that adds to the real costs of the trading technology.
The socially optimal level of investment in speed balances the search benet of speed with
the adverse selection cost of speed and the technological cost. This level is in general
strictly positive (i.e., allowing some traders to trade fast is socially optimal).
However, the equilibrium level of investment in speed exceeds the socially optimal
level. Indeed, in making their decision to invest in speed, traders balance the speculative
and search benets they can obtain by becoming fast with the cost of being fast (e.g.,
co-location fees, technological investments etc.) but they do not internalize the negative
externality of their decision (their e¤ect on adverse selection cost) on other traders. This
negative externality generates a welfare loss since higher adverse selection costs ultimately
lead more investors to abstain from trading.
In sum, Biais et al. (2015) suggest two market failures that can justify the regulation of
trading speed in securies markets. First, asymmetric information raises adverse selection
costs and thereby prevents traders from maximizing gains from trade. Second, investors
do not internalize the negative externality that their investment speed imposes on other
market participants. So there is excessive investment in speed from a social standpoint.
Budish et al. (2015) reach a similar conclusion in a model in which speed is only a way
to get quicker access to information. In this framework, speed has no social value and any
investment in speed is excessive.
As regulatory intervention, Biais et al. (2015) propose a Pigovian tax on investment in
speed as a way to align private decisions with the social optimum. Instead, Budish et al.
(2015) propose to change the organization of electronic markets, moving from continuous
limit order books to batch auctions (uniform double sided price auctions) ran at frequent
points in time (e.g., every second). They show that such a shift reduces incentives to invest
in speed for the sole purpose of picking o¤ (sniping) stale quotes after news arrival. As a
result, liquidity is improved and investment in speed is closer to the social optimum (zero
in their model).
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5 Conclusion
Theory and evidence suggest that informational speed (fast access to information) can be
harmful for market quality and welfare: it raises adverse selection costs for slow traders,
leading to less trading, and possible wasteful investments to be fast. However, theory
also suggests that trading speed has benets: it intensies competition among liquidity
providers, lowers their inventory holding costs, and expedites the search for trading coun-
terparties.
Evidence on the magnitude of these benets is scarce so far. It is often claimed that
high frequency traders have reduced trading costs. However, direct empirical evidence that
this is the case is limited and, in any case, the exact channels (inventory holding costs,
monitoring, competition, etc.) through which this happened are still not well understood.12
One reason is due to specic data challenges. Consider inventory holding costs rst and
the conjecture that they are smaller for high frequency traders, other things equal (i.e.,
holding inventory size constant). Ideally, one would like to estimate inventory holding
costs for high frequency and non high frequency market makers and compare them (again,
other things equal). Estimating inventory holding costs however require data on dealers
inventories (for estimations of inventory holding costs for non high frequency market mak-
ers, see Hendershott and Menkveld (2014) and references therein). Unfortunately, to our
knowledge, there is yet no long time series of individual inventories for a cross-section of
high frequency and non high frequency market market makers. Indeed, one would need
to observe all the trades made by each market maker in all the di¤erent platforms to be
able to compute the consolidated inventory. It is not clear that market makers (whether
slow or fast) would be willing to provide such data to researchers. Now, consider com-
petition among liquidity providers. Ideally, one would like to analyze how entry by high
frequency market makers intensies competition among liquidity providers and reduce bid-
ask spreads. However, identifying the causal impact of such entry is di¢ cult because high
frequency traders endogenously choose to be active or not in a given market or under
12Moreover, some channels can simultaneously have positive and negative e¤ects on trading costs. For
instance, entry by high frequency traders can both increase competition between liquidity suppliers (which
reduces trading costs) and raise adverse selection costs for slower traders (which increases adverse selection
costs). Measuring separately each e¤ect is therefore very important to have a good understanding of high
frequency trading.
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specic market conditions. Empiricists must therefore rely on natural experiments,i.e.,
events that trigger exogenousentries or exits of high frequency traders (i.e., entries or
exits unrelated to unobserved variables that could also a¤ect liquidity or price e¢ ciency).
Good experiments of this type are rare (for examples, see Brogaard and Gariott (2017) and
Breckenfelder (2017)). In either case (inventory costs or competition), researchers should
also be able to identify high frequency traders and non high frequency traders. Some
existing datasets allow such identication to some extent but for some limited periods of
time.
A second, maybe more serious, problem is that some of the benets of high frequency
trading, in particular the utility benet of reduction in search time, are intrinsically di¢ cult
to measure in electronic limit order markets. In contrast to liquidity or price e¢ ciency,
there are no easily observable proxies for improvements in gains from trade due to reduction
in search frictions in electronic markets. Moreover, it is not even clear that standard
measures of liquidity such as bid-ask spreads and market depth constitute good proxies for
gains from trade (see Dugast (2017)). To overcome this problem, researchers could rely on
structural estimation of models of trading in limit order markets (as for instance Hollield
et al.(2006)). This approach could potentially allow empiricists to quantify the welfare
gains or costs of increasing trading speed in securities markets and regulatory actions to
control it.
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